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Abstract
We model the pricing of public debt in a quantitative macroeconomic model with gov-
ernment default risk. Default occurs if a shift in the state of the economy leads to a
build-up of debt that exceeds the governments ability to repay. Investors are unwilling
to engage in a Ponzi game and withdraw lending in this case and thus force default at an
endogenously determined fractional repayment rate. Interest rates on government bonds
reect expectations of this event. There may exist multiple bond prices compatible with a
rational expectations equilibrium. At high debt-to-output ratios, small changes in funda-
mentals lead to steeply rising risk premia. Key determinants of the level of indebtedness
at which this occurs are the perceived amount of aggregate risk, the feasibility of revenue
maximizing tax rates, and the maturity of bonds.
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1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has turned into a scal crisis in several European countries.
An unusually large adverse shock has reduced tax revenues and lead to higher government
spending in an attempt to mitigate the consequences of the shock for aggregate output and
employment. The resulting boost in public decits has produced unprecedented levels of
government debt, which are already above 100% of yearly GDP in some countries and are
predicted to rise to even higher levels in the near future. Sizeable yield spreads between
government bonds of member countries of the European Monetary Union have emerged,
and for some countries (in particular for Greece and Portugal), yield spreads increased
dramatically in the rst quarter of 2010. While these spreads arguably reect the risk
that governments default on their debt obligations, the magnitude and the dynamics of
bond spreads are hardly understood.
According to conventional wisdom, sovereign default risk premia should increase with
the level of public debt, which is also found by several empirical articles that study the
relation between interest rate spreads of public bonds over some risk-free benchmark to the
level of a sovereign issuers indebtedness (e.g. Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009, Codogno
et al., 2003, Bernoth et al., 2006, Akitobi and Stratmann, 2008, Schuknecht et al., 2008).
However, there is a stunning variation in the relation between levels of government debt
and observed interest rate spreads on public bonds. For instance, in the last quarter of
2009, Greece had a debt-to-gdp ratio of 115% and its bonds in the rst quarter of 2010 paid
an interest rate spread over German bonds of 3.06 percentage points. At the same time,
public debt was 96.8% of gdp in Belgium with Belgian bonds yielding only 0.23 percentage
points above German ones.3 Thus the question arises why similar levels of public indebt-
edness can lead to wildly divergent levels of risk premia that manifest themselves in large
di¤erences in interest rate spreads. Moreover, recent events, in particular in Greece, have
shown that spreads can rise strongly and very rapidly, without much short-run change in
fundamentals, if investors fear impending default. Another question thus is what drives
the dynamics in risk spreads and why they may virtually explode at some point.
In this paper, we argue that empirical government bond price movements can be inter-
preted as being driven by shifts in expectations, where the ultimate source of these shifts
can be either non-fundamental or fundamental events. In particular, our point is that
investorswillingness to lend, and thus to roll over debt, is essential for the expectations of
sovereign default. Hence, if for any reason default is expected to be very likely, lenders
demand a high interest rate premium to be compensated for default risk, which raises the
3The spreads data pertain to ten year government bond yields, OECD main economic indicators, while
the debt-to-gdp gures are from Eurostat.
1
debt burden even more such that the probability of default actually increases. Phrased
di¤erently, default expectations can be self-fullling. On the other hand, the probability of
default and thereby risk premia also depend on fundamentals and expectations thereof.
A governments debt repayment capacity increases with the present value of government
surpluses, such that its credibility to raise future revenues is essential for the perceived
probability of default. Lendersexpectations about a governments capacity to repay debt
out of current and future surpluses are decisive for the premia they demand as a compen-
sation for the risk of sovereign default. Likewise, if future macroeconomic developments
are more uncertain, the perceived default probability and risk premia increase.
The paper presents a simple model which accounts for these mechanisms. We apply a
dynamic general equilibrium framework and consider an indebted government that fails to
guarantee repayment of debt in all periods, while it nevertheless aims at avoiding default
as far as possible. Specically, we consider a government that levies a proportional tax
on labor income (there are no lump-sum taxes available). It issues non-state contingent
one-period debt contracts to nance a given stream of real government expenditures, while
uncertainty is due to aggregate productivity shocks.4 The government repays its debt as
far as possible. In case of default, lenders can just seize current net revenues from the
government (a situation that di¤ers from private credit relations where the lender may
become a claimant on future prot streams).5
What determines sovereign default and risk premia in this model? Consider an adverse
productivity shock. If the shock makes the present value of future surpluses fall short of
covering the level of outstanding debt, even if the revenue maximizing tax rate which is
well dened here, because with only labor income taxation there is a tax La¤er curve with
an interior maximum , is levied for the entire future, the governments debt repayment
capacity is exceeded. A potential household-lender who realizes that he would support
a Ponzi game if he invested in government bonds will stop lending to the government.
In this case, default becomes inevitable and current surpluses are distributed to bond
holders, who therefore experience only a partial redemption of their investments. Each
individual lender assesses the probability that this event will occur in the next period
and consequently demands a default risk premium as a compensation for expected losses.
Concisely, default occurs if current debt exceeds the debt repayment capacity, while the
repayment rate is residually determined by available revenues of the government that
cannot roll over debt. This may give rise to self-fullling price expectations: if investors
4Section 4.4 also studies the changes that arise if the government issues debt of longer maturity.
5The only risk associated with investments in public debt is default risk, since we assume that bonds
are real so that debt revaluations via price level shifts (which are the focus in the scal theory of the price
level, see Woodford, 1994, Sims, 1994, or Niepelt, 2004) are impossible.
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assign a higher probability to sovereign default, they demand a higher risk premium, which
raises debt servicing costs and indeed tends to lower the repayment rate.
Our approach to model sovereign default is related to Uribes (2006) Fiscal Theory of
Sovereign Default. He considers nominal debt and exogenous surpluses in an endowment
economy to demonstrate that default is inevitable under certain monetary-scal policy
regimes. Apart from these details, our strategy to determine default substantially di¤ers
from his approach. As shown in Schabert (2010), the intertemporal budget constraint is
not su¢ cient as a criterion to determine the default rate, i.e. the fractional rate of repay-
ment of outstanding debt in the case of default. For the case which is most closely related
to our set-up, Uribe (2006) introduces an additional scal policy constraint restricting
the behavior of the default rate(p. 1869), which allows to uniquely determine the equi-
librium interest rate. For example, he considers a policy rule whereby the government
decides to default if the tax-to-debt ratio falls below a certain threshold. In the present
paper, in contrast, we instead introduce the assumption that investors stop lending in the
case where a government Ponzi-game becomes inevitable, which allows us to determine
an entire sequence of default rates without any additional restriction on the governments
behavior.6
Our approach to model default risk further di¤ers from a large body of theoretical
literature on sovereign default that focuses on external debt in open economies. In this
literature, default is modelled as an optimal decision of the government that trades o¤costs
and benets of not serving external debt (see Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, or Arellano, 2008,
among others). While this assumption has proven to be useful for the case of external debt
of emerging market economies, we view it as less suited to explain risk premia in economies
where governments have not been observed defaulting on their debt in the recent past.7
The main results are as follows. Generally, there exist multiple equilibrium prices
for government debt. In particular, two interest rates on government bonds can exist in
equilibrium: both a combination of high interest rates, high default risk, and high public
debt, as well as one of low interest rates, low default risk, and low public debt can be
compatible with the expected rate of return of investors and with the governments demand
for external funds. Default immediately occurs if the lenders coordinate their expectations
on a high risk equilibrium, thereby imposing an unsustainable nancing burden on the
government through high risk premia in the period of maturity. The mechanism that links
6Without such an assumption or Uribes (2006) scal closing rules, default rates (and rational expec-
tations thereof) can only be determined in the initial period, as shown in Schabert (2010). Bi (2010),
who also applies Uribes framework, assumes that the default rate is a policy choice variable and sets it
exogenously.
7Our approach can further be motivated by the empiricial evidence in Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008), who
nd that in surprisingly many cases default does not involve external debt.
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high interest rate premia due to default expectations to the actual default probability is
similar to the one in Calvo (1988), with the di¤erence that in our model the government
does not default voluntarily.
Furthermore, even abstracting from self-fullling default expectations, we show that
under certain conditions the governments maximum debt repayment capacity may be so
stringent that default becomes inevitable for fundamental reasons. When we focus on
the low equilibrium interest rate, which exhibits plausible comparative static properties,
default premia are monotonically increasing in the initial debt level and depend negatively
on productivity, as expected. We analyze the models predictions with respect to default
premia in terms of the implied equilibrium bond pricing curve that gives the relation
between the beginning-of-period debt level and the interest rate that market participants
demand over the risk free interest rate in equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium
pricing curve can be extremely steep above certain critical levels of debt to gdp.
For the baseline parameterization of the model, in which parameters are chosen to
capture some relevant quantitative features of the average of European Monetary Union
member countries in a stylized way, we show that non-negligible interest rate spreads
would emerge only for very high levels of debt around 200% of gdp. For the average
Eurozone country, thus, the model predicts that scal spare capacity is ample, and thus
that risk premia should be negligible at observed debt-to-gdp levels, which is consistent
with empirical evidence. However, we also demonstrate the inuences on the equilibrium
pricing curve, and hence the factors that lower the critical debt levels above which risk
spreads begin to rise steeply. In particular, we point out three such inuences.
The rst is the perceived amount of aggregate risk. If investors believe that aggregate
risk increases in the future, the perceived probability that a future adverse shock forces
government default is higher, all else equal, such that investors will claim higher risk pre-
mia. Second, the level of debt that market participants consider to entail a non-negligible
default risk depends on investorsperception of the political ability of the government to
raise distortionary taxes. If the politically feasible tax rate is perceived to be substantially
lower than the revenue maximizing tax rate, there can be high default risk premia even
at relatively low levels of debt to gdp. The third inuence is the maturity of debt. In
the baseline model, all government debt is in the form of one period debt. In practice,
however, governments typically issue bonds with longer maturity. These are subject to de-
fault risk in several periods ahead and are thus more vulnerable in the presence of serially
correlated productivity shocks. We show that in an example with two period government
bonds, spreads on annualized yields are higher than in the case of one period bonds only.
We use these theoretical results to ask what our model can contribute to the under-
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standing of movements in risk premia on Eurozone government bonds as recently observed.
Specically, we parameterize the model to capture some essential empirical properties of
scal policy and of aggregate risk in Greece. We nd that risk premia at the level of
several dozens of basis points that have been observed in Greece prior to and well into
2008 can be explained by the model, if we take into account the severity of the recent
recession and the fact that bonds with a maturity of several years are common. However,
the extreme rise in risk premia that have very recently been observed must be blamed on,
according to the logic of our model, either a loss of condence in the political ability of
the Greek government to raise taxes su¢ ciently, or even non-fundamentally induced shifts
in expectations.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
describes the determination of equilibrium bond prices. Section 4 presents quantitative
results and section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we present a simple real dynamic general equilibrium model where the
government levies income taxes and issues non-state contingent one period debt. Labor
supply is endogenous, which gives rise to a La¤er curve that bounds equilibrium tax
revenues. We consider the case where scal policy does not guarantee that the government
never runs a Ponzi-game.8 Households are assumed to stop lending to the government
when they realize that a Ponzi scheme is inevitable. Without further access to credit,
the government defaults while lenders can seize current net revenues. Households know
that this event is possible when adverse productivity shocks lead to a build-up of public
debt. They form expectations of the future fractional rate of repayment of government
debt. Accordingly, in an arbitrage-free equilibrium risk premia exist that compensate
household-lenders for the risk of government default.
2.1 The private sector
There exists a continuum of innitely lived and identical households of mass one. Their
utility increases in consumption ct and decreases in working time lt, the latter variable
being bounded by a unit time endowment such that lt 2 (0; 1). The objective of a repre-
sentative household is given by
maxEs
1X
t=0
t

ln ct+s +
1  lt+s


; with  2 (0; 1);  > 0, (1)
8This assumption is analoguous to the scal policy specication in Uribe (2006) and in the scal theory
of the price level (see Sims, 1994, and Woodford, 1994). In contrast to these studies, in our purely real
model the price level is irrelevant.
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where  denotes the discount factor. Households borrow and lend among each other via
one-period private debt contracts. Private debt is introduced here to dene a risk free
interest rate Rrft . Let dt 1 denote the beginning of period net private asset position and
1=Rrft the period-t-price for a payo¤ of one unit of output in period t+1. We restrict our
attention to the case where private debt contracts are enforceable and households satisfy
the borrowing constraint
lim
t!1

dt+s=R
rf
t+s
 tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1  0: (2)
Utility maximization subject to the borrowing constraint (2) requires the following rst
order condition for borrowing and lending in terms of private debt (i.e. the consumption
Euler equation) to be satised
c 1t = R
rf
t Et
 
c 1t+1

; (3)
as well as the transversality condition
lim
t!1Es

dt+s=R
rf
t+s
 tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1 = 0. (4)
Households can further invest in one-period government bonds bt, subject to b 1 > 0 and
bt  0. The government o¤ers one-period debt contracts at the price 1=Rt in period t that
promise to deliver one unit of output in period t+1. In contrast to private borrowers, the
government does not guarantee full debt repayment. In case of default the lenders will
proportionally be served with current net revenues. It should be noted that this di¤ers
from the case of lending to a rm, where default typically leads to lenderstaking over the
rm as a claimant on future prot streams through a debt-to-equity swap.
If current and discounted future surpluses are expected to be large enough to repay
outstanding debt, the household optimality condition for investment in government bonds
would be the analogue to the Euler equation (3), namely, c 1t = RtEt
 
c 1t+1

. The
requirement bt  0 further requires that in the household optimum the transversality
condition
lim
t!1Es (bt+s=Rt+s)
tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1 = 0; (5)
holds, where Rt+s = R
rf
t+s when the government fully services its debt obligations. If
beginning-of-period public debt exceeds a level that is too high to be repayable even for
the maximum present value of budget surpluses (see section 2.2 for a denition), the
government runs into a Ponzi game, which would be inconsistent with the households
transversality condition (5). In this case, households are assumed to stop lending to the
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government, which necessarily implies that the government defaults in period t, i.e. can
honor only a fraction of its debt obligations out of current surpluses.
Since households are assumed to have rational expectations, they realize the possibility
of partial default on government bonds and account for the probability of default (of course,
since households are atomistic, an individual investor does not take into consideration the
inuence of his behavior on the probability of default). Let 1   t denote the fraction of
government bonds that is redeemed and t 2 [0; 1] the default rate. The household ow
budget constraint then reads
ct + (bt=Rt) +

dt=R
rf
t

 (1   t)wtlt + (1  t) bt 1 + dt 1 + t;
where t are rmsprots, and labor income wtlt (with the real wage rate wt) is subject
to a proportional tax rate  t 2 (0; 1). The household optimum is characterized by the rst
order conditions (3),
ct=  (1   t)wt; (6)
c 1t =RtEt
 
c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

; (7)
and the transversality conditions (4) and (5). Note that the Euler equation for risky
government debt, (7), di¤ers from the one for risk-free private debt (3), in that the pricing
of government bonds is a¤ected by the fact that repayment is expected to be only partial
because of possible future default.
If debt bt+s 1 at the beginning of some period t+s is too large such that a Ponzi game
becomes inevitable, households do not lend to the government, i.e. the end of period debt
equals zero, bt+s = 0, and the government defaults. Lending may resume, however, in the
subsequent periods, when partial default has ameliorated the scal position.
Perfectly competitive rms produce the output good yt with a simple linear technology
yt = atlt; (8)
where labor productivity at is generated by
at = at 1 + (1  )a+ "t; (9)
here a > 0 is a constant long-run average productivity level, the coe¢ cient of autocorre-
lation is , and "t is an i.i.d. zero mean random variable. Labor demand satises
wt = at: (10)
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2.2 The public sector
The government does not have access to lump-sum taxation. It raises revenues by issuing
debt and taxing labor income, and purchases an exogenously given amount gt of the
nal good in each period. Throughout, we assume government spending to be constant,
gt = g > 0. The underlying assumption is that political constraints make a certain amount
of government spending inevitable. The ow budget constraint is given by
btR
 1
t + st = (1  t) bt 1; (11)
where the surpluses st equal tax revenues net of expenditures,
st =  twtlt   g: (12)
The government does not guarantee to fully service debt. We assume that the government
does not preclude that public debt might evolve on a path that implies a Ponzi scheme.
Since households are not willing to engage in such schemes, they may stop lending and
(temporarily) disrupt the government from access to credit.
To see this, consider, for a moment, the default free case, i.e. presume the non-
repayment rate t+k were equal to zero for all k  0. In this case, one would obtain
by iterating the government ow budget constraint (11) forward and taking expectations,
t+k = 0 8k  0)
bt 1 = Et
1X
k=0
st+k
kY
i=1
(1=Rt+i 1) + lim
k!1
Etbt+kR
 1
t+k
kY
i=1
1
Rt+i 1
: (13)
Now suppose that outstanding debt bt 1 exceeds the present value of future surpluses, i.e.
the rst term on the right hand side of (13). Then, the limit term would exceed zero,
limk!1Etbt+kR 1t+k
Qk
i=1 1=Rt+i 1 > 0. By denition, the government would then run
into a Ponzi game. But this, together with Rt+k = R
rf
t+k 8k  0 for t+k = 0 (see 3 and
7) would be inconsistent with the householdstransversality condition (5). As mentioned
above, we assume that households will then stop lending to the government, such that
bt = 0 in that period. The only way for the government budget constraint (11) to be
satised in this case is through default in the sense t > 0.
As a specic way to implement a scal policy that entails default risk in this sense,
we assume that the government keeps the tax rate constant,  t =  . This is a prominent
example of a large class of scal rules that do not incorporate enough self-corrective
behavior on the part of the government as to avoid Ponzi schemes in each period of time.9
9This assumption rules out the debt stabilizing behavior that has been found by Bohn (1998) to char-
acterize US scal policy empirically.
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However, it can also be viewed as a natural benchmark in this framework: if government
bonds were state contingent, it is well-established that in this type of model an optimal
income tax rate under commitment (and without default) would have to be constant
and su¢ ciently large to nance initial outstanding debt and future expenditures (see e.g.
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004). In this paper, government bonds are however non-state
contingent, which implies that this type of tax policy is in general not consistent with a
set of measurability constraints for each period that relate the present value of future
surpluses to the beginning of period stock of public debt to rule out Ponzi games (see
Ayiagari et al., 2002). The choice of a constant tax rate can thus, besides being a simple
example, be seen as the strategy of a government that ignores this subtle di¤erence and
sets the tax rate as if debt was state contingent.
Note that there exists a maximum value for the present value of future surpluses, which
we call the maximum debt repayment capacity. The latter is the maximum amount of debt
that the government would be able to repay if it imposed the revenue maximizing tax rate
for the entire future. A well dened revenue maximizing tax rate, , exists because with
proportional labor income taxation there is a tax La¤er curve with an interior maximum
(see section 3 for an explicit derivation). We denote the period t value of the maximum
debt repayment capacity by 	t, dened as
	t = Et
1X
k=0
st+k
kY
i=1
1=Rrft+i 1: (14)
Here, st+k = 
wt+kl

t+k g is the maximum period surplus that is obtained if the revenue
maximizing tax rate  is applied. This leads to corresponding levels of labor income
denoted wt+kl

t+k and the risk free rate R
rf
t+k is applied for discounting.
10 Note that
households will account for the maximum debt repayment capacity for their lending de-
cision in equilibrium. We thereby allow for the case where the current tax rate di¤ers
from the revenue maximizing tax rate, which could in principle be implemented by future
governments.
The maximum initial debt level that can be expected to be repaid without default
is thus characterized by bt 1 = 	t. The government will fully serve debt obligations if
bt 1  	t. As long as this is the case, no government default occurs. Default, however,
10Note that the maximum debt repayment capacity bears a resemblance to Aiyagaris (1994) natural
debt limit for consumers. Private households cannot accumulate more debt than would be expected to
be repaid by pledging the entire stream of future incomes. While households are assumed to respect the
natural private debt limit (as a borrowing constraint), the government is not constrained in an analogous
way, which is why default may occasionally occur in our model.
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becomes inevitable if the current stock of debt exceeds the maximum repayment capacity:
bt 1 > 	t: (15)
If this is the case, tax rates are not able to generate enough current and future revenues
to enable full repayment of outstanding debt.
In the case where (15) is satised, (13) with Rt+k = R
rf
t+k 8k  0 is inconsistent
with the transversality condition (5) and no individual household is willing to lend to
the government. The consequence is that aggregate lending to the government comes
to a halt, such that end-of-period debt equals zero, bt = 0, in the current period. The
government is then unable to fully honor its obligations and redeems as much as possible
of its outstanding debt out of current surpluses. As a consequence, repayment will only
be partial. The non-repayment or default rate t in the case (15) satises (see 11):
t = 1  st=bt 1 (16)
To sum up, if beginning-of-period debt bt 1 is smaller than 	t, households are willing
to lend to the government according to (7), while the government does not default in
period t, t = 0, and borrows to balance its budget such that end-of-period debt equals
bt = (bt 1   st)Rt. The price of debt, 1=Rt, then reects the probability of default in t+1.
If, however, beginning-of-period debt is too high such that (15) is satised, households
stop lending. The government then has to default and repays debt as far as possible,
with a default rate given by (16). In the period subsequent to a default event, the stock of
government debt is zero and default is not possible in the next period, such that households
are again willing to lend to the government.
2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, prices adjust to clear markets for goods, labor, and assets and the net
stock of risk-free private debt dt is zero in the aggregate. Householdsinitial asset endow-
ments are assumed to be positive, i.e. the government is initially indebted. A rational
expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences fct; lt 2 [0; 1]; yt; wt, bt  0, t 2 [0; 1]; Rrft ,
Rt; stg1t=0 satisfying (3), (6), (7), (8), (10), (12) and
yt= ct + gt; (17)
bt=
(
(bt 1   st)Rt if 	t  bt 1
0 if 	t < bt 1
; (18)
t=
(
0 if 	t  bt 1
1  st=bt 1 if 	t < bt 1
, (19)
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(4), (5), and (14), a scal policy setting  2 [0; 1], given fatg1t=0, g > 0, and initial debt
b 1 > 0.
The equilibrium allocation is not directly a¤ected by public debt and the (expected)
default rate. The rst property is due to the fact that the labor income tax is assumed
not to be contingent on the scal stance. The second property follows from the fact that
default does not lead to resource losses or distortions. Of course, the price of government
bonds will depend on the expected default rate, which can be seen from the asset pricing
equation (7). This reection of the probability of future default in the interest rate on
government bonds is our main object of study.
The equilibrium sequences of consumption, working time, output, the wage rate, the
risk free rate and government surpluses fct; lt; yt; wt, Rrft , stg1t=0 are determined for given
g and fatg1t=0 by (6), (8), (10), (12) and (17), which can be summarized by
ct= c (at; ) :=  (1  ) at (20)
lt= l (at; ) := (c (at; ) + g) =at (21)
st= s (at; ) := c (at; )  (1  )g (22)
Rrft = c (at; )
 1  1=Et

c (at+1; )
 1

(23)
as well as wt = at and yt = atl (at; ).11
While the equilibrium sequences fct; lt; yt; wt, stg1t=0 are not a¤ected by sovereign
default, these variables are of course correlated with the default rate t due to changes in
the state at. In any case, they will be stationary, given that the state at is stationary.
With the above solutions, we can easily identify a time-invariant tax rate to compute
the maximum debt repayment capacity (14). We look for a feasible tax rate  2 (0; 1)
that maximizes tax revenues for the case where the state equals its mean (at = a), wl =
 [ (1  ) a + g]. This tax rate satises F () := g + a (1  2) = 0, such that the
unique tax rate  that maximizes tax revenues is given by
 =
1
2
+
g
2a
:
In order to determine the bond prices we need to compute expectations about future
defaults. As can be seen from (36), the maximum debt repayment capacity is solely a
function of (policy and preference) parameters and of the current and future exogenous
states of the economy. Given that it contains expectations of a non-linear function of
future states, we apply a second order approximation of 	t. Though public debt might
11 If default occurs (t = 1   st=bt 1) the budget constraints imply ct = (1    t)wtlt + (1  t) bt 1 =
(1   t)wtlt + st and thus yt = atlt = ct + g.
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not be stationary, we can exploit the fact that the exogenous state variable at is stationary
and apply a local approximation of 	t at the unconditional mean a. In appendix 7.1, we
show that 	t can be approximated by:
	(at; "; ; 
) '  (1  ) at 

f(a)
1   +
f 0 (a)
1  (at   a) (24)
+
1
2f
00 (a)
1  2
 
2"
1    
2"
1  2

+
 
1  2 (at   a)2
1  2
!)
:
According to (24), 	t is a function only of todays state and time invariant parameter
values. Due to this property we can easily compute equilibrium values for the expected
default rate, public debt, and the bond price.
The expected default rate, public debt, and the bond price have to be determined
simultaneously using the equilibrium conditions (7), (18), and (19). In order to identify
these solutions, we have to consider the probabilities of the two distinct cases 	t  bt 1
and 	t < bt 1.
Let at be the productivity level that leads to a maximum debt repayment capacity 	t
that exactly equals beginning-of-period debt bt 1,
at : 	 (a

t ; "; ; 
) = bt 1: (25)
Thus, at is the minimum productivity level that allows full debt repayment and thus pre-
cludes default; we will refer to this as the productivity threshold. Further, let t (at+1) =
 (at+1jat) be the probability of a particular value at+1 conditional on at. Then, the
probabilities of default and of non-default in t+ 1 conditional on the information in t are
prob (	t+1 < btjat; bt) =
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1) dat+1;
prob (	t+1  btjat; bt) =
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1) dat+1:
We use the asset pricing equation (7), which includes the expectation term Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

.
We thereby account for the possibility that consumption and the default rate are not in-
dependent. According to the assumptions in section 2.2, the default rate t+1 equals zero
if 	t+1  bt, and t+1 = 1  st+1=bt if 	t+1 < bt. Hence, Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

is given by
Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

=
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1)

c 1t+1  (st+1=bt)

dat+1 +
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1)

c 1t+1  (1  0)

dat+1
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Using the solutions (20) and (22), the asset pricing equation (7) can thus be written as
1=Rt =

c 1t
24b 1t R at+1 1 t (at+1) hc (at+1; ) 1 s (at+1; )i dat+1
+
R1
at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1; )
 1
i
dat+1
35 : (26)
Risk premia can be computed as follows (further details can be found in appendix 7.2):
At the beginning of period t, bt 1 is known and the shock to at realizes. We get solutions
fct,stg from (20) and (22). Then, we can compute the maximum debt repayment capacity
using (24). If 	t < bt 1, the government defaults, while bonds are not traded. For
	t  bt 1, the government does not default in period t. The bond price 1=Rt, end-of-
period debt bt, and the productivity threshold at+1 then simultaneously solve (26), the
updated version of (25) which reads bt = 	
 
at+1; "; ; 

, and the governments ow
budget identity
bt=Rt = bt 1   st. (27)
After the equilibrium bond price 1=Rt is derived, we compute the sovereign risk premium
using Rt  Rrft (using 23), which is non-zero only if 	t  bt 1.
3 Multiple Equilibrium Bond Prices
In this section we examine the determination of bond prices and show that multiple equi-
librium bond prices can exist. For this, we apply a simplied version of the model. To
lighten the notation in this section, we drop the time index and dene a = at, a0 = at+1,
a = at+1 for all a 2 (al; ah), where al and ah are positive constants. We assume that the
innovations " are uniformly distributed between al a and ah a and that the productiv-
ity level is not serially correlated ( = 0). To further simplify the derivation of analytical
results, we assume that only the rst-order terms of the maximum debt capacity (24) are
non-negligible.
With these assumptions, consumption, surpluses, and maximum repayable debt are
linear functions of the current exogenous state a:
	(a) = (1  )     a 1g (1  ) 1 a = 1a; (28)
c (a) =  (1  ) a = 2a; (29)
s (a) =  (1  ) a  (1  )g = 3a  4; (30)
where in each line the second equality sign denes the composite parameters 1;2;3;4 > 0.
Further, end of period debt satises b = 	(a) = 1a (see 25), and the government
budget (27) demands 1=R = (b 1   s) =b = (b 1   3a+ 4) =1a. The asset pricing
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equation (26) can then be written as
1=R = a
(
(1a
) 1
"
3
Z a
al

 
a0

da0   4
Z a
al

 
a0
  
1=a0

da0
#
+
Z ah
a

 
a0
  
1=a0

da0
)
:
With uniformly distributed productivity levels, we get the asset pricing equation
1=R = 
a
ah   al
(
3
 
b 11   al
  4 (log b  log 1   log al)
b
+ (log ah   log b  log 1)
)
;
(31)
where we used that the solvency threshold is dened as a = b=1 (see 28).
Thus, condition (31), which can be interpreted as a credit supply condition, describes
the bond price 1=R as a function of end-of-period debt b for a given exogenous state a.
Further, the governments demand for credit is described by the period budget constraint
(27), which reads b=R = (b 1   s) or using (30), it can be written as
1=R = (b 1   3a+ 4) =b: (32)
Credit supply (31) and demand (32) provide two conditions that determine the price 1=R
and the quantity of debt b issued in period t. It can be shown that there are either no or
two equilibrium bond prices, which is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that  ! 1. Then, two equilibrium bond prices 1=R can exist.
Proof. Dene the RHS of (31) as G(b), such that 1=R = G(b). The derivatives of G(b)
are given by G0(b) =  f1 + (1a) 1 (4 ln al   4 ln a   3al + 4)gb 1 and G00(b) =
f1+(1a) 1 [4 2 (3al   4)+24 (ln al   ln a)]gb 2, where  = a= (ah   al). Given
that  ! 1) 1 ! 0 (see 28), G0(b) < 0 and G00(b) > 0 if  ! 1. Dene the RHS of (32)
as H(b), such that 1=R = H(b), where H 0(b) < 0 and H 00(b) > 0. Since both functions are
G(b) and H(b) are decreasing and convex, they generally exhibit two or no intersections.
Credit demand (32) implies end-of-period debt to be proportional to the interest rate for a
given stock of debt at the beginning-of-period b 1 and the exogenous state a, which reects
the fact that the government has to issue more debt if the interest rate is higher. At the
same time, credit supply (31) is also upward sloping, since future surpluses that su¢ ce to
repay debt become less likely for higher thresholds a (= b=1), which tends to reduce the
expected return from bonds (since it increases the probability of default) and investors to
demand a higher interest rate for compensation. Yet, with higher end-of-period debt levels
the interest rate increases more than proportionally. Hence, equilibrium credit demand
(32) and credit supply (31) imply that two equilibrium interest rates can exist.
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Figure 1: Multiple equilibrium bond prices
Depending on how investors coordinate their expectations, a high or a low equilibrium
bond price can emerge and self-fullling default expectations are possible. The mechanism
is that if lenders fear default, they will demand high risk premia as a compensation, which
adds to the governments scal burden and may indeed force default. The argument is
analogous to the one made with respect to an optimizing government in Calvo (1988). Self-
fullling default expectations are thus one way to explain recent empirical developments
where risk premia in some European countries surged very quickly and coincident with
the lowering of ratings for government bonds.
To illustrate the emergence of multiple equilibrium bond prices, we apply the parameter
values  = 0:38, g=y = 0:35,  = 0:99, and  = 0:35, and we assume that the uniform
distribution for the productivity level is characterized by ah = 1:99 and al = 0:01. These
parameters are merely illustrative examples; see the next section for a parameterization
intended to match certain characteristics of European data in the context of a more realistic
specication of the process governing aggregate risk. We choose initial debt levels to match
a debt-to-gdp ratio (at the mean of the productivity level) equal to 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
For these parameter values we plot the interest rate R as a function of the end-of-period
debt level b (which equals 1a) in gure 1, using the pricing equation (31) (the solid line)
and the budget constraint R = (b 1   s) 1 b (the dashed lines correspond to the three
15
initial debt levels considered).
As gure 1 shows, the lower equilibrium interest rate increases with a higher stock of ini-
tially outstanding debt b 1. In contrast, the high equilibrium interest rate decreases with
higher initial debt. Given this implausible comparative static property of the high equilib-
rium rate, we will focus on the lower equilibrium interest rate throughout the subsequent
analysis.12 Thus, assuming that capital market participants coordinate their expectations
on low equilibrium interest rates, we will examine how the sovereign risk premium behaves
in response to a change in the state of the economy. This will give rise to an implied equi-
librium pricing rule, which gives the interest rate spread on risky government bonds as a
function of the beginning-of-period ratio of debt to output. As gure 1 suggests, the risk
premium increases monotonically in the debt to output ratio. Yet, risk premia implied by
the uniform productivity distribution are extremely large (by empirical standards). We
will therefore drop the simplifying assumption of a uniform productivity distribution in
the next section.
4 Quantitative Results
In this section, we calibrate the model to derive quantitative results. In particular, we
consider normally distributed productivity shocks. We will further examine the role of
expectations about aggregate risk and the maximum feasible tax rate for default risk
premia. Later in this section, we consider the case of two-period bonds to assess the
inuence of the maturity of debt on default risk premia.
4.1 The calibrated model version
We relax the simplications made in the previous section and solve the model numerically
for a more realistic parametrization. We will concentrate on the lower equilibrium interest
rate and show under which conditions risk spreads can emerge and reach high levels
without a self-fullling expectation of a switch to the higher interest rate equilibrium.
We assume that the productivity process in (9) can be serially correlated,  > 0, and
that innovations "t are normally distributed. The parameters are chosen as follows. We
interpret one period as a year. The discount rate is therefore set at  = 0:97 to match a
standard average value for a risk free annual real interest rate. The tax rate  and the
share of government spending in output g=y are parameterized based on empirical averages
of data from the 16 countries currently forming the Eurozone (EURO-16). The data are
obtained from the European Commissions Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO)
and cover the time span from 1995 (the earliest period for which all data are available)
12 In simulations, we found that the realization of the high equilibrium interest rate would immediately
force default (see Juessen et al., 2009).
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to 2009. We measure the tax rate  as the ratio of the total tax burden (including actual
and excluding imputed social security contributions) over gdp at current market prices.
Likewise, we calculate g=y as the ratio of total current expenditure (excluding interest
payments) of the general government over gdp at current market prices (thus, our measure
of government expenditure includes transfers). Calculating averages of these variables over
the sample period, we arrive at  = 0:404 and g=y = 0:405 for the EURO-16. For later
use, we also calculate the corresponding values for Greece as a particularly interesting
example; the results are GR = 0:326 and (g=y)GR = 0:345.
Further, we set the mean working time share equal to l = 1=3 (and adjust  accord-
ingly). To calibrate the standard deviation of productivity shocks, we regress the log of
annual real gdp for the EURO-16 countries on a constant and a linear time trend.13 The
estimated standard deviations of real output range from y = 3:9% for the Netherlands
to y = 15:7% for Greece, with an average of 7:3%. For the benchmark case, we choose
the innovation variance in our model such that for  = 0:9, which accords to the average
of the autocorrelation in the sample of countries, the standard deviation of byt = log (yt=y)
from stochastically simulated model runs conforms with this average value.
Figure 2 shows the models pricing rule for government bonds for the benchmark
(EURO-16) parameterization, as a relation between the interest rate spread of risky gov-
ernment bonds over the riskless interest rate and the beginning-of-period ratio of debt
to output.14 The solid line displays risk premia for the steady state productivity level
(a = 1). The gure shows that with normally distributed and autocorrelated productivity
levels, sizeable risk spreads would only occur for extremely high debt ratios exceeding
about 200% of gdp. However, productivity realizations below the mean lead to higher
premia that occur at somewhat lower debt ratios, as can be seen from the dotted line in
the gure which represents a situation where productivity is ten percent below its steady
state value (a = 0:9). In this case, which corresponds to a particularly severe adverse
state, risk spreads rise strongly if debt exceeds about 170% of gdp. Furthermore, the
equilibrium pricing rule is extremely steep, suggesting that above a certain critical value
that itself depends on the current aggregate state of the economy a even small further
increases in debt can lead to rapidly increasing risk spreads.
Thus, the benchmark model predicts that market participants become extremely sen-
sitive to changes in debt at high debt-to-gdp ratios. Large risk premia will occur as a
consequence of a cyclical downturn that reduces the debt capacity and thus shifts the
13Data are from the European Commissions AMECO database; the time span covered is 1960-2008 for
11 out of the 16 countries, but shorter for Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, and unied Germany, due to
data availability.
14Appendix 7.2 presents details on the computation of equilibrium bond prices.
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Figure 2: Default risk spreads, benchmark parameterization.
equilibrium pricing curve to the left. This is rationally anticipated by households who are
thus willing to lend to the government at or very close to the risk free interest rate, unless
the debt-to-gdp ratio becomes very high. Thus, the models predictions are so far con-
sistent with evidence for the average of EURO-16 countries, where current debt-to-gdp is
far below the levels of debt at which non-negligible yield spreads arise according to gure
2.15 In the following sections, we explore the factors that would lead to sizeable spreads
emerging at lower debt-to-output ratios.
4.2 Perceived risk
We start by rst considering investors to believe in future aggregate risk that is higher
than measured in historical data, py > y: Figure 3 shows risk spreads in relation to
the debt-to-output ratio for a variance of the productivity process that is larger than
the one underlying the preceding gure 2. Note that the variance of productivity shocks
assumed in gure 2 above was chosen to match the average historical European Monetary
Union experience. Twice this value, which is depicted in gure 3, is roughly the historical
volatility value for the most strongly uctuating economy in the sample, namely Greece.
The dashed and dotted lines in gure 3 show that a higher variance of shocks can
15According to Eurostat data, the average debt-to-gdp ratio of EURO-16 countries was roughly 66% in
2009.
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Figure 3: Default risk spreads, high aggregate risk parameterization.
substantially lower the critical debt value above which premia become sizeable (both lines
in the gure are drawn for a = 1; of course, the equilibrium pricing curves would shift
still further to the left in the case of a cyclical downturn a < 1). While the debt levels
at which sizeable yield spreads occur are still higher than what is currently observed for
the average Eurozone country, the analysis shows that, for sizeable risk premia to emerge,
it is su¢ cient that perceived aggregate risk increases. The reason is that higher cyclical
volatility leads to a larger probability of a series of serially correlated adverse shocks that
make the scal position unsustainable in the future.
4.3 Maximum tax rates
So far, we have assumed that when assessing the maximum debt repayment capacity
investors use the revenue maximizing tax rate , which is the tax rate that delivers tax
revenues at the peak of the La¤er curve. In our benchmark parameterization, this revenue
maximizing tax rate equals  = 0:703 and is thus substantially higher than tax rates that
have hitherto been observed even in the most indebted countries. It might therefore be
the case that investors do not believe that the government has enough political strength
to claim a tax rate this high. As a consequence, investors might use a di¤erent, lower
maximum feasible tax rate, p say, that is below the revenue maximizing rate, but which
is for example the maximum politically feasible rate or the maximum rate that would be
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Figure 4: Default risk spreads, lower maximum tax rate.
compatible with the survival of the government in future elections.
The di¤erence between p and  is thus an indicator of the perceived ability of the
government to conduct a strict austerity program. How does this di¤erence inuence the
pricing of government debt? Figure 4 shows bond prices for the cases where the debt
capacity is based on tax rates equal to 90% and 80% of the La¤er curve maximizer 
(the dashed and dotted lines, respectively). For the volatility of productivity innovations,
we have used the baseline value underlying gure 2. Comparing this with the results from
the benchmark model that uses the revenue maximizing tax rate, see the solid line in
gure 4, one can see that risk premia start to emerge for substantially lower debt levels, as
expected. The reason is that the maximum debt capacity directly depends on the taxing
ability of the government; if the taxing ability is low because extremely high tax rates are
not credible, a given debt level entails a higher risk of non-repayment, such that interest
rate premia must be larger in equilibrium.
4.4 Two period debt
In this section, we examine how default premia are a¤ected when the maturity of gov-
ernment debt exceeds one period. For simplicity, we consider the case where the gov-
ernment issues two-period bonds only. Its period-by-period budget constraint then reads
bt;t+2R
 1
t;t+2 + st = (1  t) bt 2;t, where bt;t+2 denotes bonds issued in t maturing in t+ 2
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and R 1t;t+2 its period t price. Households invest in government bonds and trade non-
maturing bonds issued in t  1 among each other at the period t price qt 1;t. The market
value of total current debt, i.e. maturing and outstanding, can then be written as
ebt = bt 2;t + qt 1;tbt 1;t+1: (33)
Like in the one-period bonds case, we apply the intertemporal budget constraint as a
criterion for default: If total debt, as dened in (33), exceeds the maximum repayment
capacity 	t = Et
P1
k=0 s

t+k
Qk
i=1 1=R
rf
t+i 1, debt cannot be repaid and household stop
lending. Thus, default occurs if ebt > 	t. Consistent with this criterion, we assume
that the government defaults equally on maturing and outstanding bonds, where the
latter are priced according to their current market value. Hence, the default rate is then
endogenously determined by
ebt > 	t : (1  t)ebt = st: (34)
while t = 0 if ebt  	t. Like in the one-period debt case, households take into account that
the government might default, which is now relevant not only for the period of maturity
but also one period before. Thus, the period t price of a two-period bond R 1t;t+2 (which
matures in t+ 2) depends on the probabilities of default in t+ 2 and in t+ 1. As before,
we introduce a lower bound for the productivity level at at which the government does
not default ebt = 	(at ). Further, let  (at+1jat) denote the period t probability of at+1
and  (at+2jat+1) the probability of at+2 given at+1. Thus, an investor will demand the
price of two-period bonds R 1t;t+2 to satisfy
c 1t
Rt;t+2
= 2
"Z at+1
 1
 (at+1jat) (1  t+1) dat+1 +
Z 1
at+1
 (at+1jat) dat+1
#
(35)

"Z at+2
 1

 
at+2jat+1  at+1

(1  t+2) c 1t+2dat+2 +
Z 1
at+2

 
at+2jat+1  at+1

c 1t+2dat+2
#
:
Hence, the risk premium on bonds maturing in t+2 tends to rise also with the probability
of default in t+ 1. It should be noted that the default rates t+1 and t+2 depend on the
market value of total debt (see 34), and thereby on future prices of non-maturing debt. In
appendix 7.3, we fully characterize the determination of the price for two-period bonds.
Figure 5 shows the impact of the maturity structure of debt. While the solid line is the
same as in the benchmark model, compare gure 216, the dashed line gives the resulting
default risk premia  computed as the annualized interest rate spread over the riskless
16The pricing curves in gure 5 have been calculated for a smaller number of grid points than in gure 2,
because with two period debt, two rather than one critical productivity thresholds have to be determined.
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Figure 5: Default risk spreads, two period vs one period bonds.
rate if all debt is issued in the form of two period bonds (the gure assumes that half
the outstanding debt matures in the current period, while the other half matures in the
following period).
As gure 5 shows, if the government issues debt of longer maturity, the default risk
premium is higher at any given level of total outstanding debt. In the context of our
model, this implies that investorsrisk associated with government debt increases. Since
productivity levels are serially correlated, an adverse shock in period t+1 can lead to low
productivity levels also in t + 2 such that the probability of default in either of the two
periods increases. Hence, lenders will demand higher risk premia if governments use longer
term maturities. As a consequence, since the higher risk premia add to the scal burden,
default becomes more likely in this case. The model thus states that government nances
may in practice, i.e. taking into account the higher risk through longer term maturities,
be substantially more vulnerable than the above arguments based on one period bond
nancing suggested.
4.5 Fiscal stance
Finally, we examine how a scal stance ( , g=y) that di¤ers from the benchmark case
a¤ects pricing of government bonds. The exercise can be viewed as an attempt to explain
the recent dynamics in Greek bond prices. According to o¢ cial statistics, Greece had a
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Figure 6: Default risk spreads, two period bonds, Greek parameterization.
substantial primary decit on average over the past decade. When we calculate average
tax rates and government spending shares for Greece using the same methods and data
sources as before for the EURO-16 average, we get parameters values GR = 0:326 and
(g=y)GR = 0:345, respectively. As mentioned above, macroeconomic uctuations in Greece
have been more severe historically, implying about twice the level of aggregate risk than
for the Eurozone average.
Figure 6 shows that our model would predict non-negligible default risk premia to
emerge for two period bonds at debt-to-gdp ratios higher than about 100% or 120%,
respectively. Both lines in gure 6 are based on the revenue maximizing tax rate ; the
solid line is for the mean productivity level, while the dashed line is computed for the
case of a severe recession a = 0:9. To put these results in perspective, it is instructive to
look at empirical risk premia. Figure 7 shows annualized yield spreads between Greek and
German government bonds with maturities of three and ten years.17 While the spreads
are slightly larger for ten year bonds, the overall patterns are similar. From 2005 to 2008,
spreads have been less than 20 basis points, and in the rst half of 2008 at around 40 basis
points. Thereafter, yield spreads increased to more than 200 basis points, returned to lower
17Data are from the websites of the Bank of Greece and the Bundesbank. Maturities of two years that
would exactly t our theoretical model were not available; we used three year maturities instead.
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Figure 7: Empirical Spreads on Greek vs. German Government Bond Yields
levels in the second half of 2009, and went up heavily to several hundred basis points in
the rst quarter of 2010. At that time, Greek government debt stood at about 115% of
gdp. Hence, our model is roughly consistent with the spreads observed before mid-2008.
However, the extremely high risk premia in 2009 and 2010 cannot be rationalized with
fundamentals alone. Thus, the analysis suggests that shifts in expectations as suggested
in sections 4.2 and 4.3, or even a coordination of expectations on the high risk equilibrium
were responsible for these developments.
5 Conclusion
This paper has asked how the dynamic behavior of risk premia on public bonds can be
understood under the assumption that the government is committed to repay its debt as
far as possible. We have presented a model where sovereign default is the result of lenders
withdrawal of funding to the government when the governments maximum debt capacity
is exceeded. The risk premium on public bonds depends on the expected probability of
this event and on the expected rate of partial repayment in the case of the governments
inability to fully repay debt.
We have shown that the generic existence of two equilibrium bond prices can give
rise to self-fullling default expectations, since the probability of default depends on the
24
scal burden of interest payments, which themselves depend on the expected probability
of default. Furthermore, even in the case where lenders expect the lower interest rate
equilibrium, sizeable risk premia can arise. Crucially, the maximum debt repayment
capacity depends on fundamental factors. In particular, we have pointed out that the
perceived level of aggregate risk, the existence of longer-term maturities of public bonds,
and the possible infeasibility of revenue maximizing tax rates increase the default risk
premium. The model provides a rationale why di¤erent economies with similar levels of
government debt in relation to gdp have experienced very di¤erent risk premia on their
public bonds. Importantly, one implication is that risk premia may be very sensitive to
small changes in debt at high debt-to-gdp ratios.
When we ask in how far the model helps in explaining the recent surge in risk spreads
in some Eurozone member countries, the answer is mixed. On the one hand, yield spreads
below 50 basis points, as experienced for example by Greece prior to autumn 2008, are
very much in line with what the model predicts for a country that is characterized by
Greeces scal stance. On the other hand, the recent explosion of risk premia in this
country can only be explained by either a loss of condence in the political ability of the
Greek government to raise taxes su¢ ciently, or by non-fundamentally induced shifts in
expectations. In the latter case, there is obviously a useful role of interventions in the
market for public debt that steers expectations away from a high default risk equilibrium.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Local approximation of the maximum debt capacity
In this appendix, we apply a second order approximation of the maximum debt capacity
(14). For this, we transform 	t in the following way. The surpluses in (14) refer to the no-
default case t+k = 0 8k  t, where the Euler equation reads 1=Rrft+k = Et
 
c 1t+k+1=c
 1
t+k

.
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Further, using the law of iterated expectations ki=1(1=R
rf
t+i 1) = (1=R
rf
t )(1=R
rf
t+1)::: =
Et
 
c 1t+1=c
 1
t

Et+1
 
c 1t+2=c
 1
t+1

::: = kEt
 
c 1t+k=c
 1
t

, we can write
	t = Et
1X
k=0
k
c 1t+k
c 1t
st+k;
where ct = c (at; ) denotes consumption as a function of the state and the revenue
maximizing tax rate . Using the solutions for consumption and government surpluses
(20) and (22), we have
	t = c (at; 
)Et
1X
k=0
kc (at+k; 
) 1 s (at+k; ) ;
and summarizing terms we get
	t=	(at; "; ; 
) =  (1  ) atEt
1X
k=0
kf(at+k); (36)
where f(at+k) = 
   a 1t+k 1g:
Using that the exogenous state variable at is generated by a stationary process, we apply
a second order Taylor expansion of Etf(at+k) at a, which yields
Etf(at+k) ' f(a) + f 0 (a)Et (at+k   a) + 1
2
f 00 (a)Et (at+k   a)2 ; (37)
where Etf(at+k) = Et
 
   a 1t+k 1g

and
f(a) =    a 1 1g; f 0(a) = a 2 1g, f 00(a) =  2a 3 1g.
Next, we use that at+k can be written as
at+k = at+k 1 + (1  )a+ "t+k = kat +
k 1X
i=0
i(1  )a+
k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i
= kat + a

1  k

+
k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i: (38)
Hence, the mean and the variance of at+k conditional on information in period t, Etat+k
and vartat+k = Et[(at+k)
2]  [Etat+k]2 are given by
Etat+k = 
kat + a

1  k

(39)
vartat+k =Eta
2
t+k  
h
kat + a

1  k
i2
: (40)
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The term in (40) can, by substituting out at+k with (38), be simplied to
vartat+k =Et
24 kat + a1  k+ k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i
!235  hkat + a1  ki2
=
h
kat + a

1  k
i2
+ Et
 
k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i
!2
 
h
kat + a

1  k
i2
=Et
 
k 1X
i=0
i"t+k i
!2
=
1  2k
1  2 
2
":
Using (39), we rewrite (37) as
Etf(at+k) ' f(a)+f 0 (a)Et

kat + a

1  k

  a

+
1
2
f 00 (a)
 
Eta
2
t+k   2aEtat+k + a2

:
Further, using Eta2t+k = vartat+k+

kat + a
 
1  k2 = 1 2k
1 2 
2
" +

kat + a
 
1  k2,
we can simplify Etf(at+k) to
Etf(at+k)' f(a) + f 0 (a)Et

kat + a

1  k

  a

+
1
2
f 00 (a)

1  2k
1  2 
2
" +
h
kat + a

1  k
i2   2a hkat + a1  ki+ a2
= f(a) + f 0 (a) k(at   a) + 1
2
f 00 (a)

1  2k
1  2 
2
" + 
2k (at   a)2

: (41)
Summing up the discounted values of Etf(at+k) for k = 0 to 1, and using (41), we get
1X
k=0
kEtf(at+k)'
1X
k=0
kf(a) +
1X
k=0
kf 0 (a) k(at   a)
+
1X
k=0
k
1
2
f 00 (a)
1  2k
1  2 
2
" +
1X
k=0
k
1
2
f 00 (a) 2k (at   a)2
=
1
1   f(a) + f
0 (a) (at   a)
1X
k=0
kk
+
1
2f
00 (a)2"
1  2
 1X
k=0
k  
1X
k=0
k2k
!
+
1
2
f 00 (a) (at   a)2
1X
k=0
k2k
Since  and  lie inside the unit circle, the innite sums converge to nite values:
1X
k=0
kEtf(at+k)' 1
1   f(a) +
f 0 (a)
1  (at   a)
+
1
2f
00 (a)
1  2

2"

1
1    
1
1  2

+
1  2
1  2 (at   a)
2

:
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Hence, the maximum debt capacity 	 can be approximated as
	(at; "; ; g; 
)
'  (1  ) at 

1
1   f(a) +
f 0 (a)
1  (at   a)
+
1
2f
00 (a)
1  2

2"

1
1    
1
1  2

+
1  2
1  2 (at   a)
2
)
:
7.2 Computation of equilibrium bond prices
We replace the original problem presented in sections 2 and 3 by a discrete valued problem,
i.e. we assume that the models state space consists of a nite number of discrete points.
Choose the following parameters of the model:
Parameter Description Benchmark Calibration
Preferences
l Labor in steady state 1/3
 Discount factor 0.97
 Preference parameter

1  gy

l

= (1  ) = 0:3324
Productivity process
and state space
 Autocorrelation 0.9
" Std. of productivity shocks 0.0550
a Unconditional mean of TFP 1
n Number of TFP states 4001
m Number of initial debt states 4001
Government
g=y Government share 0.4053
 Tax rate 0.4037
g Level of government exp. y  (g=y) = 0:1351
 La¤er curve maximizer 0:5 + g=(2a) = 0:7032
We use Tauchens (1982) algorithm to approximate the continuous valued AR(1)-process
for productivity (see (9)) by a discrete valued Markov chain. We provide the size of the
interval Ia = [a1; an] and the number of grid points, n: Tauchens algorithm then delivers
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the exogenous state space of the model18
S = fa1; a2; :::; ang ; ai < ai+1; i = 1; 2; :::; n  1;
and the associated transition probability matrix P = (pij) ; whose row i and column j
element is the probability of moving from state ai state to state aj : Given ; the interval
Ia is chosen to include 4 standard deviations of the productivity process.
For a given combination of initial debt bt 1 and current productivity level at; the
equilibrium interest rate spread on government bonds is determined as follows:
1. At the beginning of a period t, the initial debt level, bt 1, and the current pro-
ductivity level, at; are given. Current consumption ct = c (at; ; ) ; surpluses
st = s (at; ; ) ; and the maximum debt repayment capacity of the current period,
	t = 	
 
at; 
2
"; ; ; 
 are known (see (20) ; (22) ; and (24)).
2. Calculate the risk free rate, which is given by
Rrft =
c 1t
Etc
 1
t+1
:
In this expression, the conditional expectation Etc 1t+1 is calculated as
Etc
 1
t+1 =
nX
j=1
pij  c (aj ; ; ) 1 ;
where i denotes the index number for todays stochastic state, at:
3. Check whether the government defaults in period t or not.
(a) If 	t < bt 1; the government defaults, end-of-period debt equals zero, bt = 0;
and the algorithm ends.
(b) If 	t > bt 1; the government does not default in period t and the algorithm
continues with step 4.
4. If the government does not default in period t (case 3b applied), the bond price 1=Rt
and end-of-period debt bt have to be solved simultaneously. Replacing the integrals
in (26) by sums over the nite number of states, the asset pricing equation reads
bt 1   st
bt
=

c 1t
24b 1t Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35 (42)
18We use equally spaced points  = ai+1   ai for all i = 1; 2; :::; n  1:
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Use the updated version of (25) bt = 	
 
at+1; "; ; ; 

to replace bt in (42) :
bt 1   st =
	
 
at+1; "; ; ; 


c 1t
(43)

24	  at+1; "; ; ;  1Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35 :
5. Equation (43) is solved for the unknown productivity threshold in the next period,
at+1, which is its only unknown. If there are multiple solutions for at+1 we choose
the lower value at+1 as our solution. This equilibrium corresponds to the low interest
rate equilibrium (see the discussion on multiple equilibria in section 3).
6. Given the solution for at+1; next-periods debt level bt and the asset price 1=Rt are
determined by
bt = 	
 
at+1; "; ; ; 

and
1
Rt
=

c 1t
24	  at+1; "; ; ;  1Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35
7. The risk premium on government bonds for given states bt 1 and at is calculated as
Rt  Rrft :
7.3 The case of two-period debt
The period t price of two-period debt issued in period t, 1=Rt;t+2, depends on the expected
pay-o¤ in period t+2, which is a function of the default rate t+2 and on the termination
value of the debt contract in t + 1 for the case where the government defaults in period
t + 1 (see 35). Hence, determination of the period t price 1=Rt;t+2 requires the joint
determination of (expected) default rates in period t + 1 and t + 2, t+1 and t+2. The
default rate further depend on the market value of total debt in both periods, ebt+1 andebt+2, and thus on the prices for outstanding debt, qt;t+1 and qt+1;t+2, and the price of debt
newly issued in t+ 1, 1=Rt+1;t+3. Specically, the default rates satisfy
t+1=1  st+1=ebt+1 (44)
t+2=1  st+2=ebt+2 (45)
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while the market values of total debt in t+1 and t+2, dened as ebt+1 = bt 1;t+1+qt;t+1bt;t+2
and ebt+2 = bt;t+2 + qt+1;t+2bt+1;t+3 are given by
ebt+1= bt 1;t+1 + qt;t+1Rt;t+2 (bt 2;t   st) (46)
ebt+2=Rt;t+2 (bt 2;t   st) +( qt+1;t+2Rt+1;t+3 (bt 1;t+1   st+1) for ebt+1  	t+1
0 for ebt+1 > 	t+1 (47)
where we used the government budget constraints bt;t+2=Rt;t+2 = bt 2;t st and bt+1;t+3=Rt+1;t+3 =
bt 1;t+1   st+1. Given that outstanding debt is traded within a period before the default
is realized, the outstanding debt in t+ 1 and t+ 2 is priced according to
qt;t+1= 
0B@
R at+2
 1 
 
at+2jat+1  at+1

(1  t+2) c
 1
t+2
c 1t+1
dat+2
+
R1
at+2

 
at+2jat+1  at+1
 c 1t+2
c 1t+1
dat+2
1CA (48)
qt+1;t+2= 
Z 1
 1

 
at+3jat+2  at+2; at+1  at+1
 c 1t+3
c 1t+2
dat+3 (49)
where we assumed, for simplicity, that investors neglects the possibility of default in period
t+ 3. Given this assumption, debt issued in t+ 1, is priced according to
1
Rt+1;t+3
(50)
= 2
0@R at+2 1   at+2jat+1  at+1 ct+1 (1  t+2) R1 1  (at+3jat+2) c 1t+3dat+3dat+2
+
R1
at+2

 
at+2jat+1  at+1

ct+1
R1
 1  (at+3jat+2) c 1t+3dat+3dat+2
1A
Hence, in each period, after the exogenous state is realized, the unknowns t+1, t+2,ebt+1, ebt+2, Rt;t+2, qt;t+1, qt+1;t+2 and Rt+1;t+3 can be determined by (44)-(50) where
ct = c (at; ) and st = s (at; ) and at+1 and at+2 are dened as
ebt+1 = 	  at+1 and ebt+2 = 	  at+2 (51)
given a sequence fatg1t=0, and the predetermined endogenous state variables bt 2;t > 0 and
bt 1;t+1 > 0.
Substituting out t+1, t+2, qt;t+1, qt+1;t+2, 1=Rt+1;t+3, ebt+1, and ebt+2 with (44), (45),
(48), (49), (50), and (51) in (35), (46), and (47), and conditioning on period t information,
we end up with the following system in at+1; at+2 and Rt;t+2
c 1t
Rt;t+2
= 2
"Z at+1
 1
 (at+1jat)
 
st+1=	
 
at+1

dat+1 +
Z 1
at+1
 (at+1jat) dat+1
#
(52)

24R1at+1  (at+1jat)R at+2 1  (at+2jat+1)  st+2=	  at+2 c 1t+2dat+2 dat+1
+
R1
at+1
 (at+1jat)
R1
at+2
 (at+2jat+1) c 1t+2dat+2

dat+1
35
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 
at+1

= bt 1;t+1 + (53)

Z 1
 1
 (at+1jat)
0B@
R at+2
 1 
 
at+2jat+1  at+1
  
st+2=	
 
at+2
 c 1t+2
c 1t+1
dat+2
+
R1
at+2

 
at+2jat+1  at+1
 c 1t+2
c 1t+1
dat+2
1CARt;t+2 (bt 2;t   st) dat+1
	
 
at+2

= Rt;t+2 (bt 2;t   st) + (54)Z 1
at+1
 (at+1jat)
 (bt 1;t+1   st+1)
R1
at+2
 (at+2jat+1)
R1
 1  (at+3jat+2)
c 1t+3
c 1t+2
dat+3dat+2
2
0@R at+2 1  (at+2jat+1) ct+1  st+2=	  at+2 R1 1  (at+3jat+2) c 1t+3dat+3dat+2
+
R1
at+2
 (at+2jat+1) ct+1
R1
 1  (at+3jat+2) c 1t+3dat+3dat+2
1Adat+1
where ct = c (at; ) and st = s (at; ), given a sequence fatg1t=0, and bt 2;t > 0 and
bt 1;t+1 > 0.
Computation of bond prices based on (52)-(54) To nd the equilibrium price of
two-period bonds R 1t;t+2; we have to solve the system (52)-(54) in a

t+1; a

t+2 and Rt;t+2.
We do so numerically. At the beginning of a period t; the exogenous state at and the
endogenous states bt 2;t > 0 and bt 1;t+1 > 0 are given. For a given at, the maximum debt
repayment capacity 	(at ; "; ; ; ), consumption ct; and surpluses st are determined.
To nd the equilibrium price R 1t;t+2, we evaluate the system of equations (52)-(54) for
all possible combinations of productivity thresholds in periods t+1 and t+2, respectively,
from the productivity grid S. This means that we evaluate the system of equations using
all combinations of candidate (still unknown) values for at+1 and at+2 that result from
the given productivity grid. Thereby, we use equation (52) to substitute for Rt;t+2 in
equations (53) and (54) so that the system reduces to two equations in the two unknowns
at+1 and at+2:
When evaluating the two equations at the candidate values for at+1 and at+2; the
integrals are replaced by sums over the nite number of states (as in the case of one-
period debt, see above). Accordingly, the nested integrals in (52)-(54) are calculated as
nested sums. As before, the conditional probabilities  are replaced by the respective
entries in the transition probability matrix P = (pij).
For a given combination of candidate solutions for the two productivity thresholds,
we substract the left-hand side from the right-hand side in equations (53) and (54), re-
spectively, square the respective values, and add them. We repeat this calculation for all
possible candidate solutions for at+1 and at+2 on the grid and store the respective residu-
als. The equilibrium values at+1 and at+2 are the ones for which the residual is closest to
zero.
As in the case of one-period debt, there may be multiple equilibria. We choose the
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equilibrium that is associated with the smallest values for at+1 and at+2. This equilibrium
corresponds to the low interest rate equilibrium. The solution for R 1t;t+2 is recovered from
equation (52), given the equilibrium values for at+1 and at+2: The annualized two-period
interest rate is given by the square root of Rt;t+2:
The risk-free rate for the two-period case is calculated as
Rrft;t+2 =
c 1t
2Etc
 1
t+2
:
In this expression, the conditional expectation Etc 1t+2 is calculated as
Etc
 1
t+2 =
nX
j=1
~pij  c (aj) 1 ;
where i denotes the index number for todays stochastic state, at, and ~pi is the ith row
of the two-period transition probability matrix ~P = P  P: The annualized interest rate
spread is then given by
p
Rt;t+2  
q
Rrft;t+2.
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